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Legally Speaking
from page 38
The ResearchGate organization does rec-
ognize that it relies on authors to increase the 
traffic to the website that receives revenues and 
investments from venture capital.  The organi-
zation knows that uploading and downloading 
published journal articles are illegal and the 
organization encouraged interested persons in 
the academic community to upload their work 
and join the networking site.
The organization understands that providing 
a platform for academic authors to submit their 
works can have copyright infringement issues. 
Yet, authors do submit their works, despite 
knowing that they may have given the rights 
to the works to a publisher.  However, this is 
not always the case, as co-authors may have 
submitted the work without the other author’s 
knowledge.  A reason authors submit their works 
to the networking site is to provide their works to 
as many people as possible.  Plus, some authors 
may have to meet tenure requirements, which 
would be beneficial if the authors that could 
provide statistical information on the citation 
of the work through ResearchGate. 
Despite being the creators of the work, 
authors are not included in any of the lawsuits 
involving copyright infringement.  David Han-
sen, J.D., an Associate Librarian for Research, 
Collections and Scholarly Communication at 
Duke University has discussed the lack of 
recognition of academic authors during the 
legal battles between the scholarly publishers 
and the professional networking organizations. 
In his blog, “Giving the Authors a Voice in 
Litigation?  An ACS v. ResearchGate Update” 
on February 14, 2019, Hansen noted that 
through numerous copyright lawsuits between 
publishers and other large organizations that 
the courts proceed “without much input at all 
from the actual authors of the works that form 
the basis of those lawsuits.” 
Interestingly, the organizations are hav-
ing legal battles of copyrights that involve 
millions of dollars, while the authors that 
have created work, mostly likely for little or 
no income, have no say in the lawsuits nor is 
there any financial reward should either party 
of the lawsuit win a settlement.  Possibly, the 
outcome of these lawsuits will eventually take 
in consideration of the author’s work and their 
desire to provide relevant information and 
research to the masses, such as the concept 
of scholarly communication that open access 
to information can be vital in science, the 
humanities, and for society. 
The lawsuits are providing awareness of 
the issues that have arisen in part to the new 
technology, the influx of new journals, and 
the networking sites, as well as the authors in 
context to copyright.  Other countries, such 
as China, Africa, and India, are also working 
toward better ways of providing open access 
to scholarly works, which could be significant 
in advocating for authors and supporters of 
scholarly communication.  In addition, the 
lawsuits could also be an opportunity for 
academic authors to negotiate and create new 
policies for how academic works are published 
and provided to the public.  Libraries also have 
the opportunity to provide a voice in how they 
can acquire academic works and provide the 
works for their patrons. 
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MATAL, INTERIM DIR. U.S. PATENT 
AND TRADEMARK OFFICE V. TAM.  137 
S.Ct. 1744 (2017).
“Chinatown Dance Rock” band “The 
Slants” applied for federal trademark protec-
tion for their name.  All were Asian-Americans 
from Portland.  They claimed to feel the de-
rogatory term could be “reclaimed” and drained 
of its denigrating force.
And they must have gotten that language 
from a college professor.  Or perhaps it’s 
learned in grade school in Portlandia.
At any rate, they have a niche popularity 
with the subculture of Otaku, which is Japanese 
for “geek” or “nerd” and particularly refers 
to manga obsessives.
Their music is described as synth-pop 
similar to “Chvrches” and 
“I Am X.”  Their influences 
are ’80s bands like “Duran 
Duran,” “Depeche Mode,” 
and “The Cure.”
The term “slant” refers to 
the epicanthic fold or skin fold 
of the upper eyelid, common but not universal 
among Asians.  And was once a common slur.
And our gang of rockers has albums named 
“The Yellow Album” and “Slanted Eyes, 
Slanted Hearts.”
The Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) 
denied the application based on 15 U.S.C. 
§1052(a).  It prohibits trademarks that may 
“disparage … or bring … into contempt or 
disrepute” any “persons, living or dead.”
Well, that’s pretty obviously a loser if you 
want to stop reading right here.  Can I have 
Little Bighorn Beer with George Custer on it 
stuck full of arrows?
Trademark protection is designed for 
distinctive marks — words, names, symbols 
etc. — that distinguish one arti-
san’s goods from another’s. 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. 
Samara Brothers, Inc., 
529 U.S. 205, 212 (2000).
This helps consumers 
find desired products with-
out confusion and protects the 
vendor’s good will.  Park ’N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar 
Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985).
Trademark protection is ancient in origin 
and came here with the Common Law.  For 
most of the 19th century, it was the province 
of the states.  See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco 
Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 780-782 (1992).
Congress decided to wade in in 1870, and 
the Lanham Act of 1946 provided for federal 
registration.  Lanham bars marks that are 
“merely descriptive or deceptively misdescrip-
tive” of goods.  §1052(e)(1).
More to the point, it has a “disparagement 
clause” that bars marks “which may disparage 
… persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, 
or national symbols, or bring them into con-
tempt or disrepute.” §1052(a).  The PTO asks 
whether the mark may be disparaging to a sub-
stantial composite — though not necessarily a 
majority — of the referenced group.
Who dreamed that up?  Think 1946.  The 
year before saw the birth of the United Nations, 
a dream of world government since Woodrow 
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Wilson.  Franklin Roosevelt conceived of 
the body during WWII, began describing the 
Allied Powers as the “United Nations.”  He 
was determined to join the world together 
in a love-fest of happy-clappy democracies. 
Modeled on us, of course.
I’m totally guessing.  And I sure can’t be 
bothered to delve into the Congressional record 
on the subject.
But I bet a lot of it had to do with not of-
fending the symbols of foreign nations.
Strauch’s nonsense speculations aside …
§1052(a) has been around, used incon-
sistently.  And the PTO has made it clear it 
doesn’t care if the applicant is a member of 
the disparaged group or has good intentions.
Yet the PTO has admitted that “disparag-
ing” is “highly subjective and, thus, general 
rules are difficult to postulate.”  Harjo v. 
Pro-Football Inc., 50 USPQ 2d 1705, 1737 
(TTAB 1999).
And that was before the Internet outrage 
mobs could get in a frenzy over a “Men Work-
ing” sign.
But incredibly, the PTO didn’t survey a 
whole bunch of Asians to find a substantial 
composite.  They based their ruling upon a 
quote from Urbandictionary.com and — wait 
for it — a picture of Miley Cyrus pulling her 
eyes back into a slanting shape while seated 
next to an Asian.
Tam was quoted in the media as saying 
Asians thought it all quite funny;  only white 
people balked at it.
Well, the dogged Tam contested the denial 
before the examining attorney, the PTO’s 
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board.  Then he 
went to federal court where they chose to sit en 
banc to find the disparagement clause violated 
the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause and 
was unconstitutionally vague.
No kidding.
PTO filed a petition for cert which was 
granted.
Supreme Court
Before that august body, the PTO argued 
trademarks were government speech, not 
private speech.  And the Free Speech Clause 
doesn’t regulate gov speak.  Pleasant Grove 
City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467 (2009).
Government can’t regulate speech in ways 
that favor a viewpoint at the expense of others. 
But gov has its own viewpoints and couldn’t 
function if it self-applied that rule.
Trademarks are created by the owner, main-
tained by same, and removed from the register 
if cancelled by the owner.  It is far-fetched to 
call it government speech.  Government would 
be endorsing a vast array of commercial prod-
ucts and services, many of them contradictory. 
We have registrations for both “Abolish Abor-
tion” and “I Stand With Planned Parenthood.”
What kind of govt. drivel would be put 
forward by “make.believe” (Sony), “Think 
different” (Apple), “Just Do It (Nike)?
Anyhow, registration does not mean ap-
proval.  See In re Old Glory Condom Corp., 
26 USPQ 2d 1216, 1220, n.3 (TTAB 1993).
That’s kind of cute, even without reading 
the case.
“If there’s a bedrock principle underlying 
the First Amendment, it is that the government 
may not prohibit the expression of an idea 
simply because society finds the idea itself 
offensive or disagreeable.”  Texas v. Johnson, 
491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989);  Hustler Magazine, 
Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55-56 (1988).
Parks and monuments convey government 
messages, but not trademarks.  And if you 
pushed this idea too far, a copyright would 
make a book into government speech.
And doubtless you’re aware of the Wash-
ington Redskins brou-ha-ha.  They had their 
trademark cancelled, but the Tam case obliged 
the appeals court to vacate the decision.  So 
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QUESTION:  A prison librarian asks 
about placing sound recordings on a server 
so that individual inmates are able to listen 
to the recordings via the server.
ANSWER:  Individual listening to sound 
recordings is fair use.  There are a couple of 
caveats, however.  The recording should be 
available to one inmate at a time or played in 
one living area even if multiple inmates are in 
the room.  There should also be no ability for 
inmates to download the sound recording or 
share copies electronically.
QUESTION:  An academic librarian asks 
why publishers object to controlled digital 
lending.
ANSWER:  Controlled digital lending 
(CDL) is based on the idea that it is fair use 
for libraries to digitize printed books that they 
have legally acquired and to lend those digital 
copies under restrictions similar to those phys-
ical copies of books such as lending only one 
copy of the book at a time for a defined loan 
period.  The Internet Archives has been doing 
this for some time, as have some other libraries 
even for works that are still under copyright.  
Publishers and authors certainly have no-
ticed this movement, and they claim that CDL 
is systematic infringement that negatively 
affects the incentives the Copyright Act 
provides them.  Publishers argue that 
they are now making out-of-print 
works available digitally under 
license agreements and CDL 
interferes with exploitation 
of the copyright and this new 
source of income for them.  A 
number of publishers’ group 
have joined in objecting to CDL including the 
Authors Guild, the National Writers Union, 
the Association of American Publishers, the 
International Publishers Association and the 
U.K.’s Society of Authors.
Publishers have repeatedly questioned the 
Internet Archives, and according to the Asso-
ciation of American Publishers, the Internet 
Archives has inconsistently responded to take 
down notices under the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act.  Publishers do not accept that 
CDL is the functional equivalent to hard copy 
lending.  Section 109(a) of the Copyright Act is 
the first sale doctrine under which libraries lend 
physical books in their collections.  It provides 
that once someone has legally acquired a copy 
of a physical work, he or she may dispose of 
that copy however he or she chooses.  The 
doctrine does not authorize reproduction of 
the work, however.
Therefore, the first ques-
tion is whether digitizing a 
work without permission 
of the copyright owner is 
fair use.  Traditionally, the 
answer is no.  The owner 
determines the format in 
which a work is made avail-
able and users are not permitted 
to reproduce it or to change that format.  It is 
certainly understandable that librarians would 
be attracted to the idea that digital copies are no 
different from physical copies.  This idea may 
not be supported by the Act, however, or an 
important recent court decision.  The Register 
of Copyrights has repeatedly opined that there 
is no first sale doctrine for digital works.  (See 
https://www.copyright.gov/reports/studies/dmca/
dmca_executive.html).  In addition, in a report on 
orphan works, the Copyright Office concluded, 
“there is broad agreement that no colorable fair 
use claim exists [for] providing digital access to 
copyrighted works in their entirety.”
In Capitol Records v. ReDigi, (910 F.3d 
649 (2d Cir. 2018)), the court affirmed the 
district court’s decision that finding that ReDigi 
infringed copyright through its service that 
allowed the resale of iTunes files.  The court 
